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Abstract Despite its importance and singularity, the EU’s state aid policy has attracted less
scholarly attention than other elements of EU competition policy. Introducing the themes
addressed by the special issue, this article briefly reviews the development of EU policy and
highlights why the control of state aid matters. The Commission’s response to the current
economic crisis notably in banking and the car industry is a key concern, but the interests of
the special issue go far beyond. They include: the role of the European Commission in the
development of EU policy, the politics of state aid, and a clash between models of
capitalism. The special issue also examines the impact of EU policy. It investigates how
EU state aid decisions affect not only industrial policy at the national level (and therefore at
the EU level), but the welfare state and territorial relations within federal member states, the
external implications of EU action and the strategies pursued by the Commission to limit any
potential disadvantage to European firms, and the conflict between the EU’s expanding legal
order and national.
Keywords state aid . European Union . European Commission . market regulation .
Europeanization
JEL classification D73 . F53 . H83 . K20 . L32 . L38 . L44 . L88 . L98 . O52
1 Introduction
The European Union’s regulation of state aid is inherently political. It restrains the ability of
democratically elected governments to invest and subsidise as they wish. It is clearly
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economic. State aid has the ability to distort markets and undermine competition. It also
produces legal clashes as the EU’s evolving legal order confronts established national laws
and historic policy settlements. Yet the control of state aid has long been the ‘poor relative’
of competition policy (Hansen et al. 2004: 182), a ‘Cinderella’ (Bishop 1995: 331) or ‘ugly
duckling’ (Ahlborn and Berg 2004: 41) ignored by, or peripheralised in, the academic
literature. It has been a blindspot for a number of social sciences. Thus, political scientists
have typically regarded the EU’s state aid policy as too technical,1 legal scholars often do not
regard the state aid rules as part of competition law,2 and while economists have examined
the justifications for industrial policy, they have only recently considered the regulation of
state aid to be worthy of serious interest.3
For the European Commission, however, the control of state aid has long been an
important policy instrument. The Commission’s decisions in key industries, as well as the
horizontal rules that it enforces, have had major consequences in policy sectors, old and new.
More recently, the anxiety with which the response of ‘Brussels’ was awaited when govern-
ments proposed colossal bailouts following the financial crisis that engulfed the Western
economies from 2007 served to highlight the central importance of the EU’s powers over
state aid in the member states.
The crisis also underlined the extraordinary character of EU powers.4 The control of state
aid is an exclusive and all-encompassing EU competence. It is an area where the Commis-
sion enjoys considerable freedom of action, subject only to the scrutiny of the European
courts, exercises far-reaching powers, and where its actions have consequences beyond their
immediate impact on governments and firms. Importantly, the control of state aid brings the
market economy presumption of the Treaty into confrontation with measures calculated to
achieve allocative efficiency or redistributive justice in the member states (Friederiszick et
al. 2006).
This special issue proceeds from two assumptions: the first is that the control of state
aid is a central issue in market regulation; and the second is that a full assessment of its
impact requires multi- or interdisciplinary approach. As the following articles demon-
strate, the effects of state aid regulation are felt at all levels of governance, from sub-
1 With rare exceptions, such as Doern and Wilks (1998), the same has been true of political science and
competition policy more generally (see Allen 1983). Lavdas and Mendrinou (1999: 3) observed two decades
ago that as a result of their neglect political scientists had ignored the role played by competition policy in the
organization of the European political economy, the forms and degrees of concentration of economic policy,
and, at EU level, the relations between national political economies and European and global developments.
The restrictions that EU rules impose on national policies and policy making, the power of EU institutions, the
relationship between competition policies and policies in other domains, and inter- and intra-institutional
interaction in competition policy have been similarly overlooked. Recent work by Wigger (2008), Karagiannis
(2008, 2010), Blauberger (2008, 2009a, b), Cini and McGowan (2010), Buch-Hansen and Wigger (2011)
suggest that political scientists are finally recognizing the importance and interest of this area.
2 For example, number of the classic texts on EU competition law, make no mention of the control of state aid.
We thank our colleague, Pinar Akman, for drawing this to our attention.
3 Thus, Brander and Spencer (1985) show that a competitive subsidy race by national firms competing in a
third party international market leads to a reduction in domestic social welfare, even if an individual country
might gain from profit shifting if there was no retaliation. Collie (1998, 2002) demonstrates that when there
are domestic consumers and the distortionary effect of taxation is sufficiently low, the subsidy can be
beneficial by reducing the oligopoly distortion. As with subsidising monopolies, this is very much a
second-best analysis, which takes the oligopolistic distortion as given. Subsidy games get more complex
when there is investment such as R&D involved (Spencer and Brander 1983), depending on whether rivals
respond by increasing their own investment levels or find it more profitable to cut back. Besley and Seabright
(1999) offer an insightful review, while Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) use political economy approach to
show that wasteful aid can be useful to politicians wanting to show commitment to supplying public goods.
4 For a review, see European Commission (2011).
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national authorities in the member states to global regulation in the WTO, and across a
broad range of policy domains from social policy to macroeconomic stability. At the same
time, action on the part of the EU or its institutions fails routinely to attract interest beyond
a small community of experts. Nor are there many attempts in the literature to track the
long-term effects of EU action, even though decisions taken in Brussels or Luxembourg
can have far-reaching effects on established national policy and law, member state
decision making, and third country governments and firms.
Assessing the impact of the EU’s control of state aid, domestic and international, is
the first objective of this special issue. In examining the impact of EU actions on
policy, policy making, and territorial relations in the member states, the articles that
follow seek to contribute to closing an important gap in the scholarly literature. A
second aim is to assess the European Commission’s response to the financial and
economic crisis. Governments came under strong political and economic pressure to
provide state support for firms in distress. The pressure was especially intense in regard
to banks, which have systemic importance in the national economy, but it applied also
to other sectors, traditionally considered strategic and symbolic, such as the automobile
industry. Of particular interest is how the Commission reacted to member governments’
resort to protectionist measures that threatened to undermine the single market.5 An
evaluation of levels and trends in state aid is a third ambition. Particularly important in
this regard are identification of the conditions under which governments are likely to
grant aid and how effective the European Commission’s efforts to control it.6
2 A short history of EU state aid policy
Although the key provisions governing the control of state aid were set out in the 1957
Treaty of Rome and their content (though not their numbering) has remained largely
unchanged, the development of EU control of state aid has been a long and difficult
process.7 In contrast to the competition rules governing private actors, where a ‘workable,
if challenged framework’ (Lavdas and Mendrinou 1999: 18) was established early in the
existence of the European Communities, a robust system for the control of state aid took
close to four decades to develop. Five main reasons account for why the process was so
prolonged.
First, the control of state aid is politically sensitive, as the reaction (positive and
negative) of affected parties to decisions laid down by the Commission bear eloquent
testimony. It necessitates the close scrutiny by an outside party of transactions that have
historically been the exclusive preserve of sovereign states. It involves the intervention
by an extraterritorial authority in the intimate relationship between the state and the
companies in which the state has been, and in some member states continues to be, a
major stakeholder, and the supranational adjudication of an instrument that has histori-
cally been used by governments to pursue key strategic economic, social and territorial
goals.
Second, the control of state aid was, at the time that the Treaty of Rome was signed, and
largely remains today, a novel aim. While the regulation of anti-competitive behaviour on
5 The crisis coincided with the completion of a long process of rationalisation of EU policy. To paraphrase the
comments of one observer, the Commission began to allow the rescue of UK banks, when not so long ago it
had condemned Polish shipyards.
6 This is the theme that is most advanced in the previous literature (see, e.g. Dewatripont and Seabright 2006).
7 See Lavdas and Mendrinou (1999) for an excellent discussion of the evolution of EU state aid policy.
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the part of private actors had a long history, the control and prohibition of state action to
support domestic companies or promote particular sectors was unknown. Unlike other areas
of competition policy, there was no comparable system to provide a reference point or model
for Community policy (Ehlermann and Goyette 2006),8 nor an established legal tradition
from which it could draw authority or legitimacy.
Third, the treaty provisions governing state aid are complex. They explicitly exempt
certain types of aid from the general prohibition and specify additional categories where it is
open to the Commission to decide whether aid is permissible. The treaty gives explicit
recognition to the principle that control of state aid can be traded off against other goals or
policy objectives, but does not offer any indication of how the goal of undistorted compe-
tition should be balanced against ‘the development of certain economic activities or certain
economic areas’ (Blauberger 2009a: 722) in general, or industrial policy or regional policy
in particular. Member states, EU institutions, and the Commission have unsurprisingly taken
quite different views on the relative weight that should be accorded to these considerations,
and Commission services have often found themselves on opposing sides.
Fourth, the provisions of the treaty do not impose rules at the national level. There was
‘no attempt to harmonize national rules governing the award of state aid. [Rather] EC
intervention is largely negative in nature’ (Blauberger 2009a, Quigley 2003: 2, cited in
Blauberger 2008: 14). In general terms, the treaty seeks to achieve a ‘balance between the
liberal vision of an integrated market and the Member States’ prerogative to intervene in
their own economies’ (Immenga and Mestmäcker 2007: 834 et ff, cited in Blauberger 2008:
22). However, it offers little guidance on the terms of this trade-off and, since the treaty
requires member states, the Commission could not simply impose its preferred formula.
Finally, member governments were unwilling either to cooperate in operationalizing the
provisions of the Rome Treaty or to comply with the obligations it imposed. For reasons
outlined above, they did not want their freedom of action to be restricted, nor did they
welcome the possible threat to existing policy or political embarrassment that acceptance of
the control of state aid by the EU implied. Governments wanted to retain their capacity ‘to
promote individual industries, firms or regions as a necessary and legitimate objective of
economic or social policies’ (von der Groeben 1987: 64). Thus, the Council repeatedly
rejected the Commission’s overtures and national governments contested the Commission’s
assertion of its treaty-given authority.
Against this background, the Commission struggled to develop a robust policy. For
the first 30 years of the Community — termed by Leigh Hancher (2009) ‘the Dark Ages’
of EU state aid control — the Commission could do little more than improvise with
limited resources. Unsurprisingly, under these circumstances, the framework it evolved
was uneven and difficult to administer, but nevertheless it succeeded in laying down
important markers. Surviving into the 1980s and 1990s, the policy that resulted from the
Commission’s pragmatic approach was replaced only after the Single European Act was
agreed, a change that amounted to nothing less than a ‘reformation’ (Hancher 2009). EU
state aid policy was extended and strengthened, and a new emphasis placed on compli-
ance. However, it was not until the eve of what turned out to be the financial crisis that
EU state aid policy finally entered the ‘age of reason’ (Hancher 2009). The adoption of
the State Aid Action Programme (SAAP) in 2006 marked the beginning of this new era.
The brief outline offered below starts with the terms of the treaty then proceeds to
examine the three ages of state aid policy development.
8 Hence Cini and McGowan’s description of state aid control as ‘the most original of the EU’s competition
policies’ (1988: 135).
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2.1 State aid under the EEC treaty
The state aid provisions reflected the central role granted to competition policy in creating
and sustaining a common market.9 As Hans von der Groeben, an author of the Treaty of
Rome and the first Commissioner for competition policy observed: ‘without rules on
competition and an active competition policy, even the customs union would cease to exist’
(1987: 60).10 Although restricting anti-competitive behaviour on the part of private actors
was central, it was not in itself sufficient to create a level playing field. Distortions caused by
action on the part of public authorities, such as the granting of aid to particular firms or
sectors, or preferential treatment, was also necessary. Otherwise, as customs barriers were
removed and competition intensified, some member states ‘would not be able to resist
temptation to grant applications for aid’ (von der Groeben 1987: 63–54).
Although the formal Treaty provisions on state aid have been unchanged over the years, they
have been renumbered. See Table 1 for equivalent numbers. To avoid confusion, the latest
numbering is used below even in discussion of earlier periods. The substantive prohibition of
state aid that distorts competition and the conditions that allow for exemption are given in
Article 107, which is reproduced in Box 1.
Box 1 Article 107 TFEU
1. Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in
any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or
the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible
with the internal market.
2. The following shall be compatible with the internal market:
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted without
discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned;
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences;
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of
Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages caused by
that division. Five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council, acting on a proposal
from the Commission, may adopt a decision repealing this point.
3. The following may be considered to be compatible with the internal market:
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or
where there is serious underemployment, and of the regions referred to in Article 349, in view of their
structural, economic and social situation;
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious
disturbance in the economy of a Member State;
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such
aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest;
(d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and
competition in the Union to an extent that is contrary to the common interest;
(e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by decision of the Council on a proposal from the Commission.
9 For discussion of the Treaty provisions, see Blauberger (2008, 2009a), Hancher et al. (2006), Buts et al.
(2013).
10 ‘Within a common market’, he continued, ‘competition policy is more extensive, more complex and more
necessary than in single markets where single economic area, single economic policy, one legal system, and a
common legal procedure. Common market forged out of separate national markets. To prevent distortion of
competition and to avoid unequal starting conditions, competition must create circumstances similar to those
present in national markets.’
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As with the provisions relating to other aspects of competition, the treaty granted the
Community exclusive competence over the control of state aid and entrusted far-reaching
decision-making and enforcement powers to the Commission. It also allowed the latter
considerable discretion in exercising these powers. Although state aid and measures with
equivalent effect are subject to a general prohibition (Article 107 (1) ex 92 (1)), the EEC
Treaty does not follow the example of the ECSC Treaty, which declared state aid to be
automatically illegal. The EEC Treaty, by contrast, specifically exempts three categories of
aid, which it declares to be ‘compatible with the internal market’. These are: ‘aid of a social
character, granted to individual consumers’ (107 2(a)), ‘aid to make good the damage caused
by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences’ (107 2(b)), and (added following unifica-
tion) ‘aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany
affected by the division of Germany’ (107 2(c)).
In addition, Article 107 (3) of the Treaty lists further five categories that ‘may be
considered to be compatible with the common market’ [emphasis added]. These include
measures: to promote the economic development of poor areas, to promote a project of
European interest, to remedy a serious economic disturbance in the economy of a Member
State, to facilitate development of certain economic activities, and to promote culture and
heritage conservation.11 The Commission is empowered to decide whether any particular aid
falls under one of the five categories, and since the Treaty offered no additional elaboration,
the Commission has been able to exercise considerable discretion in their interpretation.
Procedural rules for the implementation of state aid control are set out in Article 108. The
Commission, in cooperation with the member states, keeps existing aid under review and
can propose ‘any appropriate measures required by the progressive development or by the
functioning of the common market’. New aid, meanwhile, is to be notified to the Commis-
sion ‘in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, or any plans to grant or alter aid’
and cannot be transacted until the Commission takes a decision. If the Commission takes the
view that an aid is not compatible with the Treaty, it can request further information from the
member government concerned. If it still has reservations, the Commission can undertake a
more extensive investigation. Depending on the results of its findings, the Commission can
decide to approve the aid, reduce it or recover it. At all times, the Commission is accountable
to the European Court of Justice and, since 1989, the Court of First Instance.
Finally, Article 109 provides for the adoption of an enabling regulation by the Council,
acting by qualified majority, on a proposal from the Commission. This provision enables the
Community to adopt an implementing measure setting out precisely how the Commission is
to examine and investigate aids, as well as definint the conditions under which certain
categories of aid are exempted from the obligation to notify. However, despite repeated
attempts by the Commission, the Council successfully opposed adoption of such a measure
until 1998.
Table 1 Numbering of key state
aid provisions in European
Treaties
Signed Rome, 1957 Maastricht, 1992 Lisbon, 2007
Treaty acronym TEEC TEC TFEU
Numbering 92 87 107
93 88 108
94 89 109
11 A further clause permits the Council, acting by qualified majority, to add other categories, but only on the
basis of a Commission proposal.
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2.2 From the EEC treaty to the SEA: the ‘dark ages’ 1958–1991
Although its powers were clearly defined in the treaties, the Commission encountered consid-
erable difficulties in attempting to enforce the rules. For example, deciding admissibility in
individual cases was not at all straightforward.12 In the first instance, ‘facts were not easy to
establish and the Treaty left scope for various interpretations’ (von der Groeben 1987: 64). It
provided ‘little guidance on how to balance the goal of undistorted competition against the
efficiency and equity consideration of national policy makers … [or with respect to the]
development of certain economic activities or certain economic areas’ (Blauberger 2008: 7).
Moreover, governments and business interests among the Six took fundamentally different
positions on the desirability of competition and the importance of competition policy.13
Developing a policy framework was no less problematic. Insisting that unlimited subsi-
dies would undermine the common market (European Community 1959, 1960, 1961), the
Commission argued that the control of state aid by the Community was in the common
interest. It exhorted member governments to recognize their obligations and its prerogatives
under the Treaties, and asked for notification from the member governments whenever they
offered financial support to a company or sector (Commission of the European Communities
1996: 86). Though it took a firm line on the Community’s competence, the Commission was
less doctrinaire about the content of state aid policy. It explicitly recognized the legitimacy of
state funding, particularly for the purposes of structural adjustment, economic development
and social policy. Its accommodating attitude to member governments’ new (or renewed)
support for national champions in response to the defi Américain was indicative of this
flexible and pragmatic approach (Lavdas and Mendrinou 1999: 18).
Even so, theMember States refused to cooperate. No doubtmotivated by a concern to defend
key domestic interests and their own freedom for manoeuvre,14 they continued to question the
Commission’s authority and competence.15 Although in a number of rulings the European
Court of Justice confirmed the Commission’s powers, the Commission remained unable to
compel governments to meet their obligations under the treaty. The Council’s rejection of a
Commission draft regulation tabled in April 1966 to apply Articles 107 and 108 was illustrative
of the obstructive approach taken by themember states.Without such a measure, state aid policy
could not be founded on hard law.16 Determined to perform the role entrusted to it under the
treaty, the Commission pursued an alternative approach. It continued to collect intelligence—
an inventory of state aid, for example,17 — then from the late 1960s sought to use soft law to
steer government action (Blauberger 2008, 2009a; Doleys 2013).18
12 The Commission delivered only two negative decisions in the first decade.
13 Governments had widely differing policy traditions, contrasting views on what would be efficient or
welfare enhancing, and could not agree on what types of aid should be admissible. Moreover, the Commission
was divided internally on the importance that should be given to the redistributive aspects of regional aid
(Blauberger 2009a: 722).
14 Von der Groeben (1987: 59, fn 52) noted that: ‘the prominent representatives of industry and middle classes
[were] sceptical or even hostile towards the competition policy and the competition rules of the Treaty’ and
observed that ‘French industrialists in particular feared that individual sectors would not be able to survive
increased competition within the common market without a long transitional period’.
15 Von der Groeben (1987: 64) recalled that member governments argued that the Commission should limit itself to
consideration of general schemes, while the Commission insisted it should be able to decide on individual measures.
16 The Council would reject a proposal for an enabling regulation for a second time in 1972.
17 As Doleys (2013) observes, this data enabled the Commission to establish ‘references for a concept that had
previously had no clear empirical core’.
18 Soft rules have no legally binding force, but can still influence action. By contrast, ‘hard state aid law that
exempts certain categories of state aid from European control is based on Article [109] of the EC Treaty and
has direct effect’ (Blauberger 2008: 8).
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The framework initially developed by the Commission was limited and ad hoc, but its
coverage was gradually extended. The Commission began this expansion in 1968, when it
targeted regional aid, following concerns that governments were attempting to attract inward
investment and thereby to distort competition.19 It then turned its attention to specific industrial
sectors (shipbuilding and textiles) that were the recipients of government aid, and later to
horizontal aids that cut across industrial sectors — such as aid granted for, environmental
protection, or to SMEs. In a series of communications, notices and guidelines, the Commission
set out the criteria against which individual schemes were to be evaluated (Lavdas and
Mendrinou 1999: 31–33) and under what circumstances aid would be exempted.20
Following suspicions that governments were distorting the market by overcompensating
publicly-owned companies for the provision of services of a general interest, the Commis-
sion asked governments to provide information about their transactions in a series of
domains.21 In order to determine whether governments were supplying financial support
that was anti-competitive, the Commission elaborated the concept of the market economy
investor principle (MEIP). The MEIP provided the basis for a key test to determine whether
an investment made by a public authority should be considered a normal transaction such as
would be made by an investor seeking to make a profit (Nicolaides 2003; Niels et al. 2011:
388–401). If on the evidence a private concern would not have made a comparable
investment, the proposed transaction could be considered to constitute state aid and ap-
proved only if it fell within one of the categories of permissible aid. In practice, however,
little pressure was brought to bear on states to comply until 1983 when the Commission
began to oblige member governments to recover illegally granted state aid from the firms
that had benefitted from it (Smith 1998: 64).
By the early 1980s, a state aid policy of sorts had developed. The Commission had
developed ‘a more or less explicit model of what it consider[ed] … “good” state aid policy
with regard to the “common interest” at the European level’ (Blauberger 2009a: 720).
Although it was based on soft law and was therefore limited — the Commission could in
effect only bind itself (Mestmäcker and Schweitzer 2004: 1180f, cited in Blauberger 2009a:
726) — the framework at least enabled the Commission to ‘shield itself from political
pressure’ (Blauberger 2009a: 720). As possible exceptions were now set out explicitly, the
Commission was left ‘less exposed to political conflicts about individual measures’
(Blauberger 2008: 12). In addition, it established an effects-based understanding of aid as
any state measure that distorts competition by conferring a selective advantage on certain
undertakings or the production of certain goods and affecting inter-state trade that, moreover,
was endorsed by the European Court of Justice, ‘provided that the duty to give reasons for
decision is discharged’ (Hancher 1994: 134).
Despite these advances towards an EU state aid policy, important problems persist. The
framework was incomplete and provisions differed between sectors. Detection and compli-
ance remained serious weaknesses. The codes and guidelines applied categories that fol-
lowed less the wording of the treaty and more the Commission’s own priorities (Blauberger
2008, 2009a), which created uncertainty. The policy was also marked by a number of
procedural shortcomings. Commission processes were not transparent and it made little
19 In 1971, the Commission issued a follow-up communication, indicating how Articles 107(3(a) and (3)(c)
applied to systems of regional aid in the Member States.
20 It was not sufficient only for aid to be consistent with the objectives set out in Article 107(3), but
compensation for the beneficiary over and above the effects of normal market forces had to be justified and
the indispensability of the state aid to the achievement of the objective in question had to be demonstrated.
21 France, Italy and the UK challenged the legitimacy of this request before the Courts, but were unsuccessful.
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information publicly available. The status of third parties, locus standi, and cases where the
Commission failed to act (Hancher 1994) were further sources of dissatisfaction.
2.3 State aid and the single market programme: the ‘reformation’ 1992–2004
The 1992 project not only enhanced the status of competition policy, but granted the rules
governing state aid a profile that they had not previously enjoyed (Ehlermann 1992). It was
widely recognized that the internal market would require the effective control of state aid.
Once single market legislation had removed the possibility of protection by regulatory
means, the provision of subsidies would become the main tool available to governments
(Ehlermann 1992). However, the benefits of liberalisation would be lost if a subsidy race
were to break out between the member states.
At the same time, a long-standing challenge to stricter rules on state aid was removed.
The rise of economic neoliberalism, on which the internal market project was predicated,
removed — at least in theory — the conflict between competition policy and industrial
policy. Since in a market economy competitiveness was to be achieved through the free play
of competition, state intervention, which had historically involved provision of financial
support for national champions, was precluded from the outset. According to this new
understanding, the relationship between industrial policy and the control of state aid was
no longer zero-sum (Lavdas and Mendrinou 1999: 19).
From the mid-1980s, and for more than a decade after 1992, EU state aid policy developed
and expanded. The Commission took a more systematic approach to the regulation of state aid.
Existing guidelines and communications were revised (for example, in regional aid), new codes
were introduced for areas not previously covered, including recently liberalised sectors, such as
air transport (see Kassim and Stevens 2010: ch 9), and a number of loopholes were closed.22
There was a general re-orientation from sectoral aid to horizontal objectives — support for
SMEs (2001) and training (2001), and for promoting employment (2002) — and R&D.
Although not always articulated as such, these are areas where an economic justification —
correcting positive externalities (i.e. Pigovian subsidies) — can plausibly be posited. The
Commission also refined key concepts and tools, such as the MEIP (see Nicolaides et al.
2005), marking the beginning of a new economic approach to state aid policy. In addition,
progress was made on improving the procedural rights of third parties and on the award of
damages.
In a new environment where the imposition of sanctions was now a real possibility, the
positions historically adopted by member governments and the Commission were reversed.
Member governments wanted a framework that offered greater predictability than was afforded
by the soft law regime. Their long-standing opposition to an implementing regulation gave way
to a demand for clear, detailed procedures. By contrast, the Commission, which had long
advocated such a measure, was now fearful of losing not only the leverage it had painstakingly
acquired, but also the flexibility associated with soft law (Smith 1996). In the event, it submitted
a proposal which led eventually to the 1998 Council Regulation (Lavdas andMendrinou 1999:
37). This enabling Regulation allowed the Commission to issue block exemptions, which
contributed significantly to the simplification of the corpus of rules, and codified existing
guidelines (Hancher 1994).
The adoption of the 1998 Regulation was a major milestone. It signified that: ‘member
states finally accepted their obligation not to grant state aid without prior Commission
22 The 1997 Multisectoral Framework (MSF), which closed the loophole that allowed governments to provide
incentives to individual investors through sectoral policy frameworks, is an important example.
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consent’ (Blauberger 2008: 9). It also recognized the Commission’s power to order the
recovery of illegal aid — a ‘new practice of demanding the repayment of illegally granted
aids’, which as Ehlermann observed (1990: 70), had been ‘unthinkable’ only a few years
before. The Commission sought at the same time to improve notification and introduced a
code of conduct for non-notified aid. It also carried out a survey of the subsidies paid by
governments as part of an attempt to tighten control of both new and existing aids (Lavdas
and Mendrinou 1999: 24). The survey, which was later superseded by the annual state aid
scoreboard,23 was intended to pressure on governments ‘naming and shaming’.
2.4 The state aid action plan: the ‘age of reason’ 2005-
The overhaul of rules and procedures initiated by Neelie Kroes, the Commissioner for
Competition under the first Barroso Presidency, marked a new phase in the development
of the EU’s state aid policy, and indeed its maturation. Five years previously at the Stock-
holm European Council, the Heads of State and Government had urged ‘less and better
targeted aid’. The Commission’s State Aid Action Plan (SAAP), which resulted from a state
aid review, was partly a response to this call. The tradition of state interventionism in most of
the new accession states added a new urgency. Following the 2003 overhaul of the anti-trust
regime and the 2004 reform of the merger regulation, the revision of the state aid rules
extended the modernization of EU competition policy to this important area. As part of the
revised Lisbon Strategy aimed at structural reform in the member states, the revised rules
could be shaped for the first time into a policy, which set priorities and which explicitly
favoured support for industries or activities that were likely to generate growth and
employment.
In its consultation document,24 the Commission stated its conviction that ‘a market based
economy provides the best guarantee for raising living standards in the EU’ (2005: 6) and
that state aid control is necessary ‘to maintain a level playing field… in the Single European
Market’ (2005: 7). It also observed that state aid can help achieve objectives of a common
interest. It ‘can correct market failures… [or] help promote e.g. social and regional cohesion,
sustainable development and cultural diversity’ (2005: 10).25 For the first time, the Com-
mission took the view that the control of state aid should be cast as a policy rather than
simply a framework of rules that prohibit distortions to competition.
The SAAP was guided by four principles. The first was that aid should be permitted only
when it is: ‘an appropriate instrument for meeting a well defined objective of common interest,
… creates the right incentives and is proportionate to the problem…, [and] when it distorts
competition to the least possible extent’ (Kroes 2005). Second, aid should be evaluated by an
economics-based approach. Proposed aids were to be assessed in regard to their effects rather
than whether they breached the prohibitions set out in the treaty. Third, procedures should be
efficient and transparent, with the aim of making the overall architecture simpler and to reduce
the administrative burden. Fourth, there was to be a partnership with member states, which was
considered essential if prohibited state aid is to be recovered. Importantly, member states must
provide evidence to support aid in the context of an overall ‘balancing test’: ‘In assessing
whether an aid measure can be deemed compatible with the common market, the Commission
23 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/studies_reports.html.
24 European Commission (2005)
25 The social objectives come from the Treaty. Sources of market failure widely accepted in the economics
literature are set out in the SAAP: externalities; public goods; imperfect information; coordination problems;
market power.
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balances the positive impact of the aid measure (reaching an objective of common interest)
against its potentially negative side effects (distortions of trade and competition)’ (2005: 19).
The state aid regime underwent a comprehensive overhaul as these principles were
operationalized. Guidelines and communications were reviewed, revised and streamlined.
Thus, a new general block exemption (GBER) harmonised rules that had previously been
spread across five separate Regulations,26 and designated 26 types of measures which would
be considered automatically compatible if they satisfied specified conditions.27 The focus
was resolutely on horizontal aid, including risk capital in SMEs (2006), research and
development and innovation (2006), and environment aid (2008), though checklists were
incorporated in sectoral guidelines to make it easier to determine whether aid would be
acceptable. In addition, the ‘refined economic approach’ moved the Commission away from
the strict prohibition of aid that infringes the state aid rules and placed the emphasis on the its
overall effects. The balancing test attempts to weigh the positive and negative effects of a
proposed aid, alongside an assessment as to whether it is appropriate, what incentives it
creates, and its proportionality. Greater use was also made of de minimis provisions. Finally,
a new emphasis was placed on recovery — a new unit in DG COMP was created for this
purposeand efforts made to improve cooperation with national courts and national author-
ities to improve compliance and enforcement.
In short, the implementation of the SAAP brought about a major transformation of
the state aid regime. The rules are more transparent, easier to administer, and less
burdensome. The replacement of a legal by an economics-based approach addresses
long-standing criticisms of EU policy and also brings state aid into line with the other
competition rules. This is not to say that no problems remain. State aid control is still
a privileged dialogue between the Commission, national governments and favoured
firms, political pressures have not evaporated, and complainants remain in a weak
position. While introducing a much clearer conceptual framework, the balancing test
is not necessarily easy to implement, particularly when it comes to rescue and
restructuring aid.28
Chart 1 shows how these policy changes have affected the level of state aid since 1992.29
Expressed as a percentage of GDP — and excluding aid due to the financial crisis — state
aid fell from 1.12% in 1992 to 0.62% in 1999.30 The ‘reformation’ had succeeded. Since
then, despite some fluctuation, the level of state aid has remained at around 0.60%.
However, its composition has changed. The share of sectoral aid (excluding agriculture,
fisheries and transport) fell from 39% in 2002 to 15% in 2010, with most of the change
occurring before 2007. The main effect of the SAAP has therefore been compositional —
less aid targeted at specific sectors being replaced by horizontal aids; or, in other words, less,
but better targeted aid. It is possible that, in the absence of reform, aid intensity would have
risen with the accession of new members in 2004 and 2007. Thus, an additional total effect
may be in evidence. Of course, not to include crisis aid, which was almost all directed to the
banking sector, is a very important omission.
27 Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes (2008: 3) reported that 65% of all aid measures were block
exempted in 2007 compared with 40% in 2002.
28 Buts et al. (2013) find that by 2007 Commission decisions were in line with the SAAP approach.
29 The data are taken from the EC State aid scoreboard: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_
reports/studies_reports.html
30 The jump in 1997 was due to a huge spike in French sectoral aid. Ganoulis and Martin (2001) argue that
much of the decline in manufacturing aid in the 1990s was due more to fiscal discipline than to state aid
control.
26 They cover respectively: SMEs, research, innovation, regional development, and training, employment and
risk capital.
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3 EU state aid policy and the financial crisis31
The crisis— first financial, then economic— broke shortly after the overhaul of the state aid
regime had ushered in the ‘age of enlightenment’ (Hancher 2009). The Commission
introduced a series of measures to deal with the upsurge of Member State requests for state
aid to see banks and later other companies through the downturn.
It is not straightforward to compare crisis aid with more traditional state aid but 30% EU
GDP was at risk in supporting the financial system 1998–2010, and a further 9% EU GDP
was made available to rescue or restructure individual banks (Lyons and Zhu 2013). Much of
this was in unused guarantees and other loans required payment of interest. Stripped back to
the pure subsidy element, state aid to financial institutions still represented some 3% EU
GDP. Had Chart 1 included crisis aid, the scale and trends of the last two decades would
have been occluded. In terms of the administrative burden, the impact on the Commission’s
workload and on the progress of reform has been enormous.
Since the 1990s, the Commission has developed procedures, periodically updated, for
managing aid directed to companies experiencing difficulty.32 The framework for the rescue
and restructuring (R&R) of companies in difficulty was based on ‘normal’ state aid rules,
Article 107(a) and (c).33 The guidelines of 1 October 2004 were due to expire after 5 years
— that is, mid-crisis — and were extended quite reasonably until 9 October 2012. The
guidelines had to some extent anticipated the SAAP and provided that aid for rescue and
restructuring of companies needed to be justified by social or regional policy concerns, by
the need to maintain a competitive market structure (i.e. when exit could lead to a monopoly
or oligopoly), or to support the role played by SMEs.
The aid also needed to pass the balancing test. In other words, it should ‘not adversely affect
trading conditions to an extent that is contrary to the common interest’. The idea that R&R aid
should be permitted only in exceptional circumstances and the distortions caused to competition
offset by the benefits was powerful in limiting the extent of state aid during the crisis. A number
of safeguards were applied: a firm’s viability must be restored on the basis of a plan; aid should
32 The criteria for a firm in difficulty is that it should have lost half its capital and more than a quarter of its
capital over last 12 months.




















Chart 1 The evolution of state aid in the EU
31 This section draws heavily from Hankin (2009). See also Nicolaides et al. (2005).
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be ‘one time, last time’; firms should provide ‘compensation’; and the aid should be the
minimum amount necessary to restore its viability.34
The procedure draws a distinction between rescue and restructuring. Rescue covers those
situations where aid is offered in the form of temporary liquidity support — loans or
guarantees provided for no longer than 6 months — and should be the minimum to keep
the firm afloat whilst a restructuring or liquidation plan is developed. Restructuring, by
contrast, requires a ‘feasible, coherent and far reaching plan to ensure a firm’s long term
viability’. Rescue aid must be repaid and the Commission’s scrutiny is lighter touch than for
non-recoverable restructuring aid.
Adapting these principles, the Commission on 17 December 2008 adopted a ‘temporary
framework’ to deal with the crisis. It was based on Article 107 (3)(b), which permits ‘aid to
remedy serious disturbance in the economy of a member state’. This carried forward many of the
features of general rescue and restructuring aid as well as setting out approval mechanisms for
general schemes that member states could use to support their banks (e.g. credit guarantees)
without requiring an individual investigation of each bank separately. The Commission’s main
objectives were to alleviate the credit crunch and, by supporting access to finance, to enable firms
in the real sector to be able to invest in the future. The broader aim was to forestall a rush to
protectionism.
The next stimulus for reform was Europe 2020. This programme was a response to sluggish
growth and sets targets for employment, innovation, education, social inclusion and climate/
energy. It might give a push to a new activist industry policy, but the macroeconomic context of
fiscal austerity promises to be a highly effective means of state aid control. Nevertheless, the
State Aid Modernisation programme was adopted in May 2012 and aims to facilitate aid that is
‘efficient, well-designed and addresses a real market failure’ while deterring aid ‘that generates
significant distortions of competition without bringing any real value added’.35 These goals are
to be achieved by developing ‘fewer, clearer and more rational rules’, by focusing on cases that
have a more significant impact on the internal market, and revising the state aid guidelines. It
remains to be seen if this search for simple principles can be achieved in the politically charged
setting of state aid.
4 Political science and EU state aid
The political science literature on state aid offers important insights in a number of key areas.36
Particular attention has been paid to state aid and industrial policy. The two are intimately
connected, since subventions are a key component of industrial policy, but are only permissible
under EU state aid rules where the Commission has granted an exemption. The clash between
the control of state aid and other EU policies has also attracted interest. Wishlade (1993, 2008),
for example, has explored the conflict with regional policy and examined its consequences for
the EU and the member states. The extra-territorial impact of EU state aid rules is a further
theme that has attracted scholarly attention. Cremona (2003) and Blauberger (2009b) explored
their effects in the states of central and Eastern Europe that acceded to the EU in 2004. Rubini
(2009), meanwhile, has compared the EU’s regime to the control of subsidies by the WTO.
Coverage is uneven, however, and in some areas the literature is distinctly sparse.
35 Speech by Commission Vice-President Joaquin Almunia, 8th May 2012.
36 See especially Smith (1998, 2001), Lavdas and Mendrinou (1999), and Cini and McGowan (2010).
34 Compensation is discussed in Lyons and Zhu (2013). The ‘one time, last time’ condition has not proved a
credible principle. For example, airline companies have repeatedly sought and received state aid over the years
(see Kassim and Stevens 2010: ch 9).
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There are particular gaps in research on the political economy of state aid control,
with Dewatripont and Seabright (2006) two of the few authors to address the topic.37
Although the December 2007 special issue of the Journal of Industry, Competition
and Trade examines the potential benefits of subsidies to address market failure, it
does not give a central role to the regulation of state aid by the Commission.
Moreover, although the literature routinely discusses important decisions of the Com-
mission or rulings of the European Courts, it pays considerably less attention to the
cumulative effect of these interventions — a surprising omission given not only the
turn to Europeanization in the literature in recent years, but also scholarly interest in
the EU’s impact on national industrial policy. Issues, such as the influence of EU state
aid policy on the decline of support for national champions (Hayward 1995),38 or
whether action in this area has privileged the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism over
French and German models, for example, have yet to be fully explored (see Albert
1991; Amable 2003; Crouch 1997, 2005 for discussion of contrasting models of
capitalism).
Furthermore, key questions remain unaddressed. A first set concerns the Commission.
How is the Commission’s role in the control of state aid best conceptualised, and how does it
compare to other areas of competition policy? A second relates to the impact of EU action on
national policy and policy making. How, if at all, has EU state aid policy affected social and
welfare policies in the member states? Third, what have been the consequences of EU state
aid policy on territorial relations within member countries and specifically on sub-national
authorities in federal states?39 Fourth, the external impact of the EU’s state aid policy has not
been systematically investigated. Has EU action harmed European companies by depriving
them of support that third countries are prepared to supply, or has it improved their
competitiveness by submitting them to the rigours of the market? A final set of questions
relate to member governments. Under what conditions, institutional, political and economic,
do governments typically grant aid? Which sectors do they tend to support in this way, why,
and how have their priorities changed or remained stable over time?
A further limitation of much of the existing literature has less to do with substantive
issues than with scholarly approaches. The economic, legal and political aspects of EU state
aid policy frequently interact, but academic analyses are written overwhelmingly from the
perspective of a single discipline. As a result, important insights are lost. It is not only that
scholars working on the control of state aid in one discipline do not cite publications from
any others, but that as a result of drawing on the methodological approaches and tools of one
discipline alone key features of EU action or its impact are not addressed and understanding
inevitably remains partial.
This special issue addresses several of these concerns. It highlights the importance of EU
control of state aid and shows that EU action in this neglected area of competition policy has
far-reaching implications. It examines the Commission’s response to the economic and
financial crisis, the dynamics of policy development and impact of the EU’s state aid policy
in industrial policy and beyond. It compares the approaches of governments to granting aid,
and looks at some of the external consequences of EU policy.
38 See Hayward (1995), Kassim and Menon (2006), and Kassim and Stevens (2010). McLaughlin and
Maloney (1999) contend that the Commission has ‘broken up long standing institutionalized government-
industry relationships’. See Clift and Woll (2012) for an alternative view.
39 Streb (2009) is an exception.
37 For further examples of the economics literature, see Spector (2009), Ganoulis and Martin (2001), and
Neven and Verouden (2008).
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5 New perspectives on EU state aid policy
The first contribution to this special issue, by Thomas S. Doleys, investigates how the
Commission’s approach to the implementation of the treaty provisions on state aid has
changed over time. Doleys (2013) argues that the Commission confronts a dilemma of
discretion. The grant of formal autonomy gave the Commission broad discretion, but it also
made the Commission vulnerable on account of the wide-ranging powers entrusted to it.
Drawing on principal-agent theory, Doleys highlights the importance of the non-formal
mechanisms that member state principals used to constrain the Commission. He argues that
the Commission’s strategy of what Lavdas and Mendrinou (1999: ch 2) term ‘restrained
formation’ can be explained as a response to the signals it was receiving from the national
capitals. Doleys shows how Commission action from the late 1950s was conditioned by
member state non-compliance and how the Commission (as agent) was disadvantaged by
information asymmetries that favoured member state principals.
The second and third articles examine the Commission’s crisis response to the banking
and the automobile sectors respectively. Banks were clearly at the centre of the storm and
present some of the most dramatic examples of rescue and restructuring aid ever experi-
enced. Bruce Lyons and Minyan Zhu (2013) note, for example, that as many as 40 banks
received rescue and other aids as a result of the crisis. Lyons and Zhu reflect on the systemic
importance of banks as providers of finance — an essential input into all other productive
activities — and the claims on which their calls for special treatment were based. They
recognize that banks could not be allowed to fail and argue that the techniques used by the
Commission for assessing the aid elements of the main forms of bank support were largely
appropriate. At the same time, they suggest that the Commission was less rigorous in
determining the level of aid that is desirable and question the anticompetitive nature of
some of the ‘compensatory measures’ imposed by the Commission.
The car industry was the largest industrial sector affected by the crisis. Historically, a
laboratory for state support and venue for industrial disputes, the reflex response of govern-
ments in the US and in Europe was once again to reach for the pocketbook. In their
contribution to the special issue, Nicolini et al. (2013) examine the support given by
governments to the industry over the long term. They observe a reduction over time in the
aid directed to car manufacturing, a shift from sectoral to regional aid, and differential effects
in the impact of aid, which has sometimes increased and sometimes diminished capacity.
More broadly, they contend that the EU has ended the special relationship between govern-
ments and particular large firms or national champions. They argue, however, that the EU's
achievements in the field have been the outcome of ‘control, but not strategy’ — accident,
rather than engineering. They contend also that the instruments used by the Commission are
of questionable effectiveness and that decisions have often been in contradiction, raising
questions about policy coherence. In the face of over-capacity, restructuring aid has been
approved at the same time as aid for new production facilities in other member states has
been permitted.
The next two papers examine the consequences and role of state aid in two member
states, though the implications of these national case studies are much wider. Buts et al.
(2013) ask whether state subsidies have a discernable impact on market structure in
Belgium. They do not distinguish the motivation for the subsidy, and their data does not
include non-subsidy aid (e.g. guarantees, soft loans, tax breaks), but they do have a database
covering grants for investment in fixed assets awarded to all firms in Belgium with at least
100 employees. Some such aid will have been exempt from control by the Commission and
other such aid will have gained clearance. Their core finding is that the amount of subsidy
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granted in 2006 resulted in a significant increase in the subsidised firm’s market share two
years later. It is noteworthy that this effect was found during the post-SAAP ‘age of reason’.
The authors cautiously conclude that this was not the declared aim of the aid. In other words,
there remains room for improvement in EU state aid policy.
Turning to the investigation of the wider role of EU state aid policy, Ben Clift (2013)
examines state aid as a form of economic patriotism, which he argues exemplifies a
particular case of the paradox of neoliberal democracy. Although governments seek election
in order to determine the fate of a political community, their effective control is circum-
scribed by a wider context of interdependence and, in the case of EEA member states, a
supranational regulatory regime. Governments have sought to invent new forms of inter-
ventionism in a neoliberal world where market-making and re-regulation are the only
permissible tools. In this context, the state is neo-mercantilist, but liberal in character. Clift
examines state aid in France, which has a long traditional of state interventionism in support
of strategic sectors and firms. He finds that dirigisme — and to a lesser extent the French
model of capitalism — has survived, as the French state has been able successfully to
reinvent interventionist mechanisms to suit the new era. He points to the permissive
elements of the EU’s state aid regime, which permits support for R&D, innovation, and
environmental protection, as well as individual cases such as Renault, SFI and the rescue of
the banks— a list to which Air France might also be added (see Kassim and Stevens 2010).
In the case of BNP-Paribas, he notes, that ‘assistance… enabled BNP-Paribas to exploit the
crisis to pursue an aggressive external expansion policy which made the bank the largest in
the Eurozone’. The current crisis, which many believe was partly due to neoliberal ebul-
lience, may provide a platform for a resurgence of economic patriotism, though that will be
tempered by fiscal austerity.
Michelle Everson (2013) discusses how a shift in how the European Court of Justice
understands the state aid regime may have a profound and controversial effect on national
social policy. In a national political economy, there are constitutional (and cultural or
traditional) constraints that limit the scope and domain of the market. At EU level, however,
there is a strong bias towards economic efficiency, since the treaty makes it easier to achieve
negative than positive integration. Everson examines how the ruling of the EU in the Ruffert
case threatens the authority of national orders to demarcate domains of social and economic
policy. ‘The European Court of Justice’, Everson argues, ‘used to treat public procurement
as distinctive part of EU state aid regime which might be reconciled with redistributive
concerns at national level’, but now the EU services regime has been applied to procure-
ment. This ‘realignment’, she contends ‘reflects a mismatch between European economic
and national social competences, and a friction between national and European conceptions
of constitutional legitimacy’. The privileging by the European Court of Justice of econom-
ically rationalising arguments over political interventionist discretion at the national level
has upturned jurisprudence on state aids in one member state and seems to presage the
further encroachment of market logic into the social policy domain.
State aid also has an infra-national dimension. The conventional wisdom in the scholarly
literature is that sub-national authorities are unequivocal beneficiaries of European integra-
tion. The EU has made it possible for sub-national authorities to communicate with each
others, as well as with the European Commission, creates new arenas for exerting influence
in a transformed structure of opportunity, and makes available sources of revenue that are
beyond the control of their capitals. In his contribution, Hagen Streb (2013) contests this
view. Drawing on the experience of Austria, Belgium and Germany, and using the state aid
review as a case study, he argues that the European Union has undermined and disempow-
ered sub-national states in federal political systems. As the Commission treats them no
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differently from any other public authority, sub-national governments can no longer exercise
the autonomy or perform the functions intended by the national federal orders in which they
are embedded. The effect has been to flatten national territorial structures, a finding that
contradicts the dominant wisdom concerning the impact of European integration on sub-
national regions.
Nikos Zahariadis (2013) investigates a further aspect of EU impact. Using a database of
state aid decisions between 1992 and 2007, he seeks to identify ‘winners and losers’ among
the member states. In his terminology, a ‘winner’ is narrowly defined as a country that can
get more state aid past the Commission’s scrutiny. He outlines two hypotheses. The first is
that decisions are imposed by the Commission, which is able to act autonomously and
dictate terms to member governments. The second, which he prefers, is that state aid
decisions are best seen as the outcome of power politics between the member states and
the Commission, where the outcome is likely to reflect the relative power of the two actors
and larger member states are able to prevail. The distribution of aid among the member states
reflects the political priorities and size of the member states. He also examines the factors
that influence the level of demand for aid. He tests whether demand is shaped by worsening
economic conditions, the severity of trade dislocation, and the number of parties in govern-
ment, and finds that the first and third matter most. Zahariadis concludes that if the aspiration
of the Stockholm European Council for less aid that is better targeted is to be realised,
attention must be directed towards national capitals rather than to Brussels.
The final articles address external aspects of EU state aid policy. Chad Damro (2013)
examines the interaction between state aid and trade. Subsidies can act as a barrier to market
entry and run counter to the trade rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Aggrieved
parties can lodge an appeal under the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agree-
ment and brought to the dispute settlement mechanism. DG Trade can become involved
either when aid that has been authorised by the Commission is challenged by third countries
or when aid granted to a foreign firm threatens to prevent EU firms from entering a foreign
market. Damro examines the role played by private interests, what affects their choice as to
which of the two tracks they choose under the subsidies and countervailing measures
agreement, and their interaction with EU institutions.
Blauberger and Krämer (2013) examine the impact of EU state aid policy on the
competitiveness of European firms. Since EU state aid rules limit the subsidies that govern-
ments can grant to EU firms, they hypothesize that EU firms will be disadvantaged in global
competition or the Commission will come under pressure to relax the rules where there is no
effective control of state aid outside EU. Such a situation arose in car manufacturing in 2009.
The Commission has sought to remove or reduce this pressure by promoting the adoption of
EU-style state aid and public procurement rules outside the Union. It had directed efforts at
third countries and campaigned within the WTO. Blauberger and Kramer assess the success
of these efforts.
6 Conclusion
The extraordinary character of the EU’s rules on state aid was starkly underlined by the
economic and financial crisis. With governments desperate to save their banks and to bail
out their industries of strategic and symbolic importance, the Commission’s reaction was
fundamental first to the survival of these sectors and indeed of the European economy, but
also to ensuring that rescue was managed subject to conditions that would secure compet-
itiveness in the longer term. At the EU level, the state aid rules were the main instrument for
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ensuring that aid was accompanied by restructuring (European Commission 2011: 8) and not
simply cash injections that would enable firms to survive the crisis, but harm competition
thereafter. As Lyons and Zhu (2013) and Nicolini et al. (2013) show in banking and
automobile manufacture respectively if calculating the effects of state support is not an
exact science, anticipating the impact of Commission decisions with any precision is no less
straightforward.
As these and other contributions to this special issue show, the impact of EU state aid
policy has had a far-reaching impact in industry and financial services. It has not, however,
ended. Indeed, as Clift (2013) shows, states such as France, that have historically followed
strategies that featured high levels of financial support for industries or firms, have amended
or recast rather than abandoned traditional policies and practices. Buts et al. (2013) demon-
strate that even post SAAP reforms, state aid still has a significant influence on the market
share of subsidised firms in Belgium. Aid continues, and continues to have real effects, but
whether the benefits actually outweigh the harm to competition even in the ‘age of reason’
requires further investigation.
Importantly, the effects of EU action have not been restricted only to industrial policy. Its
impact has been felt in other sectors (Zahariadis 2013), notably social policy (Everson
2013). Moreover, EU policy has affected territorial relations in those Member States with
federal political systems (Streb 2013). It also has important consequences for EU govern-
ments and firms beyond the borders of the Union (Damro 2013; Blauberger and Krämer
2013).
These investigations of the effects of the EU control of state aid and the processes by
which the Commission has developed EU policy (Doleys 2013), demonstrate the importance
of EU action in this field. They also highlight the extent to which, beyond the work of all but
a few authors, EU state aid has been neglected in mainstream EU scholarship. In short, the
special issue has shown that EU state aid policy is a subject of central importance, with
implications across a broad range of policy areas, that deserves wider attention.40
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